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Abstract
Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs
and discount rates who delegate to a manager the choice of a produc-
tion plan. The shareholders and the manager can trade contingent
claims in a complete asset market. Shareholders cannot observe the
chosen production plan and design a compensation scheme so that
at equilibrium the manager chooses the plan they prefer and reveals
it truthfully. We show that at equilibrium i) profit is maximized,
ii) the manager gets a constant share of production, iii) she has no
incentive to trade. We then show that such equilibrium exists if and
only if the manager has the same belief and discount rate as the
representative shareholder. This allows us to characterize the re-
quired characteristics of the manager as a function of shareholders’
characteristics.
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A fundamental literature dating back at least to Berle and Means (1932)
analyzes how managers should be chosen and remunerated so as to act in
shareholders’best interest. A first challenge is how to define shareholders’
interest, given that corporations are often owned by many investors with
possibly different tastes and beliefs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) famously
proposed to define a “corporate objective function”as the result of “a com-
plex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals are brought
into equilibrium.”
A large part of the following literature has studied agency problems
from the perspective of a representative shareholder, abstracting from the
underlying equilibrium process. In this paper, we take a different per-
spective. Assuming that shareholders delegate the production choice to a
manager and that they can trade assets with her in a complete financial
market, we model explicitly how heterogeneous shareholders may reach an
agreement on a commonly preferred production plan. Assuming further
that the actions taken by the manager cannot be observed, we investigate
how to define the characteristics of the manager and her compensation so
as to make her act in shareholders’interest.
In our model, shareholders have heterogeneous discount rates and be-
liefs. The manager chooses a production plan, which determines a flow of
uncertain output over time. Shareholders cannot observe the plan chosen
by the manager, they only observe the realized production. A contract for
the manager specifies her compensation at each date as a function of the
history of production.
Given a compensation scheme and a price process, the manager consid-
ers the indirect utility associated to each possible production plan, that is
the maximal utility she can obtain by choosing a consumption plan subject
to her budget constraint. She then chooses a production plan that maxi-
mizes her indirect utility and the associated optimal consumption plan and
announces the production plan to shareholders. Each shareholder chooses
a consumption plan so as to maximize her expected utility subject to her
budget constraint. A manager-shareholders equilibrium is then defined by
a compensation scheme, a production plan, a price process and a list of
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optimal consumption plans for the manager and shareholders such that,
as usual, markets clear and with the following distinctive features: the
manager has no incentive to misreport the chosen production plan and the
chosen production plan is unanimously preferred by all shareholders.
We start by deriving some intermediary results that define some prop-
erties that our equilibrium must satisfy. First, we show that an equilibrium
plan maximizes the value of the firm’s production at equilibrium price. This
echoes a well-known result that, in complete markets, shareholders would
agree on profit maximization or, equivalently, on aggregate dividend max-
imization. Notice however that the result is not immediate in our setting,
in which production, prices, and the manager’s compensation are jointly
determined in equilibrium. A priori shareholders’aggregate dividend is not
equal nor proportional to the value of production, the difference between
these two quantities corresponding to the value of manager’s compensation.
Second, we show that the manager’s compensation is necessarily linear
or, equivalently, the manager is given a fixed share of production. Third,
we show that the manager does not trade in the financial market. In fact,
the manager would misreport the chosen plan unless at equilibrium the
marginal value of her compensation is proportional to her marginal utility
of consumption. It follows that her consumption profile coincides with her
compensation. Intuitively, if this were not the case, the manager could
increase her utility by announcing a given plan, implement a different one,
and exploit the induced mispricing by trading on her private information.
Hence, at equilibrium, the manager has no incentive to trade.
From the previous results we obtain a characterization of a family of
manager-shareholders equilibria, if they exist. These results allow to con-
struct our equilibrium by separating the manager’s maximization problem
from that of shareholders. The equilibrium production plan maximizes the
manager’s utility on the set of production plans. At the same time, it is the
equilibrium production plan if the firm was run only by the shareholders,
according to profit maximization.
We define the representative shareholder at equilibrium as a fictitious
shareholder who - if endowed with the equilibrium production plan - would
have no incentive to trade at equilibrium prices. We can then state a nec-
essary and suffi cient condition for the existence of a manager-shareholders
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equilibrium. We show that such equilibrium exists if and only if the man-
ager has the same characteristics as the representative shareholder at equi-
librium.
The properties of the representative agent at equilibrium have exten-
sively been studied in the literature on aggregation of preferences and be-
liefs in asset markets. To derive some properties of the equilibriummanager
as a function of shareholders’characteristics, we assume that all sharehold-
ers have same CRRA instantaneous utility function. The representative
shareholder at equilibrium is then an expected utility maximizer with the
same CRRA instantaneous utility function, whose belief is a function of
shareholders’beliefs and discount rates and whose discount rate is time de-
pendent or stochastic. In particular, when all shareholders and the manager
share the same belief but differ in their time preference, the manager needs
to have a declining discount rate. This is because aggregate consumption
in the distant future is mostly in the hands of more patient individuals.
When the horizon becomes arbitrarily large, the manager needs to behave
as the most patient shareholder. An implication is that a manager whose
discount rate is an average of shareholders’discount rates would take deci-
sions that are too focused on the short-term relative to shareholders’best
interest. Moreover, when shareholders have the same constant discount
rate but different beliefs, the manager cannot have the same discount rate
as shareholders. Rather, she needs to put a higher weight on distant con-
sumption than any of the shareholders. Put differently, a manager with
the same discount rate as the shareholders would be short-termist.
We think our results have important implications for the study of agency
problems. Our setting is most closely related to a common agency prob-
lem, in which an agent faces multiple principals with possibly conflicting
interests (as started by Bernheim and Whinston (1986)). Our key distinc-
tive feature is to embed this problem in a general equilibrium setting, in
which the asset market is used to mediate and possibly align shareholders’
conflicting interests. In this perspective, we highlight the importance of
modeling explicitly shareholder heterogeneity and the equilibrium process
leading to the definition of a representative shareholder. In our model, the
representative shareholder is defined at equilibrium, and as mentioned be-
fore, it is the representative shareholder at a production equilibrium when
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the firm is run only by shareholders according to profit maximization. As
we show, the insights one would get by taking the representative share-
holder as given would be different, and possibly misleading, especially in
settings where shareholder heterogeneity is important.
We qualify the view that agency conflicts are minimized when the man-
ager is also a shareholder, which has motivated the rise in stock compen-
sation. Stock compensation indeed appears as necessary in our setting. At
the same time, we emphasize that the manager must have the same char-
acteristics as the representative shareholder. Otherwise, whatever fraction
of the firm’s share she owns, she would take decisions not unanimously
supported by all shareholders.
In this respect, we view our results mostly as normative, emphasizing
the conditions for the existence of a manager-shareholders equilibrium in
which the manager’s actions are perfectly aligned with shareholders’ in-
terests. From a positive viewpoint, we do not take the existence of such
an equilibrium as granted. It may be very diffi cult or impossible to find
a manager with the same characteristics as the representative shareholder.
Under this perspective, one may interpret our results as suggesting the
impossibility of reaching an equilibrium in which the production decision
is delegated to a manager while serving shareholders’interests. However,
we view this paper only as a starting point in addressing the question of
delegation. A natural next step is to investigate whether richer contracts
(that may include trading restrictions for the manager) together with pos-
sibly non-linear compensations may help achieving a manager-shareholders
equilibrium. In a companion paper (Bianchi, Dana and Jouini (2020)), we
define conditions for existence of a manager-shareholders equilibrium in a
setting where trading restrictions can be imposed on the manager. We get
back to this issue in more details in the concluding remarks.
Our paper builds on the literature on aggregation of preferences and
beliefs in asset markets.1 Our focus on agency problems between a manager
and shareholders is however novel in this literature. Similarly, we relate to
the literature on asset pricing with production and agency costs.2 This
1Recent contributions include Detemple and Murthy (1994); Gollier and Zeckhauser
(2005); Jouini and Napp (2007); Jouini, Marin and Napp (2010); Cvitaníc, Jouini,
Malamud and Napp (2012); Xiong and Yan (2010); Bhamra and Uppal (2014).
2See for example Dow, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2005), Albuquerue and Wang
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literature typically abstracts from shareholder heterogeneity. Our analysis
is complementary, as we abstract from asset pricing implications and focus
on how to choose and remunerate a manager in a way to minimize agency
costs.
Managerial compensation has generally been studied under the perspec-
tive of a representative shareholder (see e.g. Murphy (1999) and Murphy
(2012) for reviews). We provide new insights by embedding the choice of
the compensation in a stock market equilibrium with heterogeneous share-
holders. In this spirit, Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) consider a
market with heterogeneous beliefs and short-selling constraints and show
that shareholders may prefer short-term speculative strategies.3 In our
model, the market is effi cient and there is no resale, but (ineffi cient) short-
termism may arise as the result of shareholder heterogeneity.
We also relate to the literature on firms’objectives when shareholders
are heterogeneous. Magill and Quinzii (2002) review fundamental problems
posed by market incompleteness, as well as classic contributions address-
ing these problems. Bisin, Gottardi and Ruta (2016) study competitive
equilibria in a production economy with incomplete markets and agency
frictions and derive fundamental welfare properties.4 We instead focus on
the design of the compensation scheme and keep shareholders’objective as
simple as possible by assuming complete markets, or - more precisely - full
spanning. As explained in Magill and Quinzii (2009), this assumption is
typically much weaker than market completeness, and it means that it is
possible to find a portfolio of assets that pays one unit if a given outcome
for the firm is realized, and nothing otherwise.
The way information asymmetry is introduced makes our paper in line
with the probability approach to general equilibrium developed by Magill
and Quinzii (2009). Indeed, we assume that shareholders do not observe
states of nature but only the production outcomes, so from their point of
view, production plans only differ by the outcomes probability distribution.
(2008), Gorton, He and Huang (2014).
3Alternative equilibrium models have instead focused on the labor market equilibrium
(e.g. Gabaix and Landier (2008)) or on financial market equilibrium with a representa-
tive agent (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia (1982)).
4Other recent contributions include Zame (2007), Demichelis and Ritzberger (2011),
Magill, Quinzii and Rochet (2015), Crès and Tvede (2021).
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Accordingly, we consider contracts that are contingent on the possible re-
alizations firm’s production as opposed to being contingent on exogenous
states of nature.5
2 Model
We consider a firm owned by a group of shareholders, who are heteroge-
neous in beliefs and time preferences, and run by a manager. The firm
produces a non-storable consumption good, which we use as numeraire,
according to a production plan y. This plan is a random process in which
yt(ω) defines the production of the firm at date t in state ω. There is a
finite set of production and consumption dates T = {0, ..., T} or T = {T}
when there is only one consumption/production date.6 The information
structure is modeled by a filtered probability space (Ω, (Ft)t∈T , P ).
We denote by X the space of production and consumption processes
x = (x0, . . . , xT ). For each t, xt is assumed to be Ft measurable so that
xt only involves information up to date t. We denote by X ′ the space of
state-price densities p where, for a given date t ∈ {0, ..., T} and a given
state of the world ω ∈ Ω, pt(ω) corresponds to the price as of t = 0, of one
unit of consumption at date t in state ω. For a given price process p, the
value of the consumption process x is p · x =
∑T
t=0E [ptxt] , where E is the
expectation operator under the probability P .
For these expectations to be well defined, we have to further impose
that production and consumption processes in X are such that E|xt|r <∞
for all t ∈ T and that price processes in X ′ are such that E|pt|r
′
< ∞,




7 We denote by X+
5As underlined by Magill and Quinzii (2009) "That this assumption is realistic seems
to be confirmed by the striking fact that the contracts which are used to finance invest-
ment and share production risks– bonds, equity and derivative securities– are either
non contingent or based on realized profits and prices, rather than on exogenous events
with fixed probabilities."
6For ease of presentation, all definitions and results are stated for T = {0, ..., T}. The
adaptation to the T = {T} is straightforward.




is then a Banach
space whose dual (the space of continuous linear forms onX) isX ′. In factX is Lr space.
It can be seen as Lr
(




Ω̂, F̂ , P̂
)
is the direct sum of the probability spaces
(Ω,Ft, P ) , i.e. Ω̂ is the disjoint union of T +1 many copies(Ωt) of Ω, F̂ is the σ−algebra
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and X ′+ the set of nonnegative processes, respectively, in X and X
′. For
Y ⊂ X, we denote by Y+ the set Y ∩X+.
In terms of notations, while x and y will be used to denote random
consumption and production processes taking their values in RT+1, z will
be used to denote vectors in RT+1 and, henceforth, generic values taken
by x or y. As usual, x ≤ x′ (x  x′) means xt ≤ x′t (xt < x′t) almost
everywhere for all t, and x < x′ means x ≤ x′ and x 6= x′. Finally, we
denote by µ and µt the Lebesgue measure, respectively, on R and Rt.
2.1 Production
We focus on the unique consumption good that is produced by the firm.
Therefore, the choice of a production plan corresponds to the choice of a
technology that transforms these inputs into units of consumption good
across time and states of the world.
We let Y ⊂ X denote the set of production plans. Denote with NY (y)
the normal cone of Y at y,
NY (y) = {p ∈ X ′ : p · (y′ − y) ≤ 0,∀ y′ ∈ Y } ,
which corresponds to the set of linear forms that reach their maximum on
Y at y. We will say that y ∈ Y is positively exposed if there exists p 0
such that p ∈ NY (y). Note that a positively exposed production plan y is
effi cient in the sense that it is not dominated by other feasible production
plans : @y′ ∈ Y, y′ > y. We denote by Eff+(Y ) the set of positively exposed
production plans.
We say that Y is smooth if, for all ȳ ∈ Eff+(Y ), there exists p  0
such that NY (ȳ) = {λp : λ ≥ 0}. This condition states that at positively
exposed plans, the tangent cone (i.e. the polar of the normal cone) is a half
space and it ensures that Y has no outward kink.
We will say that Y is strictly convex from above if for (y1, y2) ∈ Y 2 and
t ∈ (0, 1) , there exists y ∈ Y such that ty1 + (1− t)y2 < y.8








8Let us recall that Y is said strictly convex when for all (y1, y2) ∈ Y 2 and t ∈ (0, 1) ,
ty1 + (1 − t)y2 ∈ int(y). It is immediate that strict convexity implies strict convexity
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We make the following assumptions:
Assumption (P)
(P1) Y = K−X+ where K ⊂ X+ and such that 0 ς ≤ K ≤ Ξ for some
ς and Ξ in X+,
(P2) Y is closed, strictly convex from above and smooth,
(P3) If y ∈ Eff+(Y ), the random variable y has a density hy with hy > 0,
µT+1−a.e. on RT+1+ .
Assumption (P1) implies the classical free disposal assumption, Y −
X+ ⊂ Y . It also provides an upper bound on Y+. Finally, assumption (P1)
ensures that utility maximization on Y leads to plans y such that ς ≤ y ≤ Ξ.
Note that under the free disposal assumption, strict convexity from above
implies the convexity of Y . Assumption (P1) and (P2) are standard in
the general equilibrium literature in finite dimension. Assumption (P3)
states that for every positively exposed production plan, all trajectories
taking positive values are possible.9 This implies that by observing a given
trajectory of realizations (yt(ω)){0,...,T} of a given production process in
Eff+(Y ), shareholders are not able to exclude any plan y ∈ Y from the
set of possibly chosen plans. This assumption underlies the information
asymmetry between the manager and the shareholders in our model.
In order to illustrate Assumptions (P2) and (P3), we consider the fol-
lowing example, in which production and consumption only take place at
date T.
Example 1 (Controlled Ito processes) Let (Wt)t∈[0,T ] be a Brownian
motion on some probability space (Ω,G, P ) and (Gt)t∈[0,T ] be the (augmented)
filtration generated by (Wt)t∈[0,T ] . For a (Gt)t∈[0,T ]−progressively measur-
able positive real valued process θ such that
∫ T
0
θ2s < ∞ a.e., we define
from above. However strict convexity is a much stronger condition and requires, in
particular, a nonempty interior.
9In this assumption RT+1+ might be replaced by some [A,B]
T+1 for 0 < A < B. In
this case, all the considered functions that are defined on RT+1+ are replaced by functions





as the solution of dyθt = µ (θt) y
θ
t dt + θty
θ
t dWt and y
θ
0 = 1 where
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µ (z) = 1 − (z−2)
2
2+|z−2| . We denote by Θ the set of such processes θ and by
Y the set of terminal values yθT for θ ∈ Θ. We take T = {T} , F = GT ,
X = L2(Ω,F , P ). It is shown in an Online Appendix that Y = Y − X+
satisfies (P2) and (P3).
2.2 Shareholders
The firm is owned by a group of N shareholders, i = 1, ..., N . We denote
with νi shareholder i’s initial endowment of shares, and we assume νi > 0
for all i. Shareholders have no other endowments, and they are heteroge-
neous in their time preference rates ρi assumed to be constant and in their
subjective probabilities Qi. All subjective probabilities are assumed to be
equivalent to P and we denote by M i the density of Qi with respect to P,




A key ingredient in our analysis is that shareholders do not observe
the plan y = (yt)t∈T chosen by the manager nor the state of the world
ω. At date t and in state ω, their information is given by the history of
realizations (ys (ω))s=0,...,t. As already mentioned, by Assumption P3, the
observation of a given trajectory does not allow them to infer the chosen
plan nor the state of the world. It follows that shareholders can only trade
assets whose payoffs are contingent on the history of the production process
y. More formally, let C be the set of contingent contracts C : X+ → X+
whose payoffs at date t ∈ T and for a given y are of the form ct(ω) =
Ct(y0(ω), ..., yt(ω)), for some measurable functions Ct : Rt+1+ → R+. Given
y, shareholders only trade consumption processes in C(y) = {C(y), C ∈ C}.
All shareholders have the same consumption space X+ and they are
assumed to be expected utility maximizers. The expected utility of share-









10In this example, the instantaneous level of risk (volatility) is given by θ and the
instantaneous rate of return (drift) is given by µ (θ) . The rate of return increases with
the level of risk until a given risk level θ∗ = 2 and then decreases. And when there is no
risk, θ = 0, there is no return.
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for some γ < 1. We further assume the following:
Assumption (C)
1. For all i, M i and M iςγ−1 belong to X ′,
2. For all i, M iςγ and M iΞγ belong to L1
(
Ω, (Ft)t∈T , P
)
.
Assumption (C) assures that shareholders’marginal utility is well de-
fined in all directions and that their utility is well defined on K.
2.3 Manager
The firm is run by a manager. As mentioned, we do not model explicitly
why shareholders need to delegate this choice to a manager. A standard
argument is that they lack the time or the skills needed to implement the
plan, which may require continuous adjustments over time.12
We assume that the manager is an expected utility maximizer with
instantaneous utility u, as defined in (2), she has a constant time preference
rate ρm and a subjective probability Qm equivalent to P with density Mm.





The manager is given a contract described by a compensation scheme Φ :
X+ → X+. As shareholders can only observe the realized production,
the compensation at date t can only depend on the history of realizations
11Assuming that shareholders have no other endowments than their shares of the firm
and that instantaneous utility functions are CRRA with homogeneous risk aversion pa-
rameters, will appear as crucial for the proof of existence and uniqueness of a production
equilibrium as seen in Appendix 2.





. That requires having the skills to assess the impact of the chosen θ on
the dynamics of the production process as well as the time to continuously monitor the
signals and adjust the risk exposure accordingly.
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y0 (ω) , . . . , yt (ω) . That is, Φ(y) must be of the form
Φt(y (ω)) = φt(y0 (ω) , . . . , yt (ω)), (3)
for some φt : Rt+1+ → R+ assumed to be continuous almost everywhere.
Shareholders delegate to the manager the choice of the production plan.
In the framework of Example 1, this means that the manager chooses the
degree θt of risk exposition at each date t. In this respect, the example
has some similarities with Sannikov (2008), with two important differ-
ences. First, our model has as many principals as the number of share-
holders. Second, manager’s choices in our case are not determined by an
arbitrage between effort and compensation but through a more complex
market mechanism, as we detail below.
To explain how the manager makes her choices, let us introduce the
concept of indirect utility of production plans for a given price process.
Given a price process q and production plan y, let Vm(y, q) be the maximal
utility of the consumption processes that the manager can obtain by trading
her compensation under her market constraint c ∈ C(y) and her budget
constraint q · c ≤ q · Φ(y),
Vm(y, q) = max{Um(c), c ∈ C(y), q · c ≤ q · Φ(y)}. (4)
Given her compensation and a price process q, the manager chooses a
production plan y that maximizes her indirect utility Vm(·, q) over Y and
an optimal consumption plan Cm(y). The manager announces the chosen
plan y to shareholders. who maximize the utility of their consumption
plans under their market and budget constraints. From Assumption (P3),
when y is in Eff+(Y ) (which is the case for example if Φ is increasing),
shareholders cannot verify the truth of the announcement and the manager
can implement a plan with higher utility of consumption. Therefore the
manager implements y only if Um(Cm(y)) = maxy′∈Y Um(Cm(y′)).
For further use in the definition of equilibrium, let V i(y, q) be the max-
imal utility of the consumption processes that shareholder i can obtain by
trading her share of production under her market and budget constraints:
V i(y, q) = max{U i(c), c ∈ C(y), q · c ≤ νi(q · (y − Φ(y)))},
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where νi denotes her initial share and y − Φ(y) is the production left to
shareholders after having paid the manager. Equation (4) and the corre-
sponding shareholders’equation show how the manager and the sharehold-
ers assess the utility associated to the various alternative production plans.
They compare their indirect utility under y to the one they would have
obtained under any alternative y′ ∈ Y, by taking prices q as given.13
2.4 Equilibrium
Let us now define our concept of equilibrium between shareholders and
the manager. We have in mind a setting with a large number of non-
strategic shareholders. We take a general equilibrium approach in which
resource allocation is decentralized through prices and which we adapt so
as to account for the information asymmetry between the manager and the
shareholders.
Definition 1 A manager-shareholders equilibrium is defined by a compen-
sation scheme Φ, a production process ŷ ∈ Y, a list of contingent contracts
(Ĉi)i, a contingent contract Ĉm, and a price process q̂ such that:
1. ĉi = Ĉi(ŷ) maximizes U i(c) on {c ∈ C(ŷ), q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ · (ŷ − Φ(ŷ)))},




i + ĉm = ŷ,
4. Vm(ŷ, q̂) > Vm(y, q̂) for all y ∈ Y \ {ŷ},
5. Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) = maxy∈Y Um(Ĉm(y)),
6. V i(ŷ, q̂) > V i(y, q̂) for all y ∈ Y \ {ŷ} .
For a given ŷ, conditions 1 to 3 define an exchange equilibrium (with
market constraints given by c ∈ C(ŷ)) between the manager and the share-
holders with endowments Φ(ŷ) and (νi(ŷ − Φ(ŷ))i. Together with point 4,
13Price taking is important to be able to define a consensus plan (see e.g. Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion on price taking behaviors and unanimity). Price
taking could also be derived by considering a setting with a large number of identical
firms. The analysis would not be affected.
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they define a concept of equilibrium in the spirit of a production equilibrium
(with market constraints) in which the choice of the plan is determined by
the manager. Point 5 highlights a key distinctive feature of our equilib-
rium, relative to more standard agency problems in partial equilibrium. In
our setting, the manager is not only choosing a production plan but also
her consumption plan Cm(y), possibly by trading in the asset market. This
opens the possibility for the manager to announce a given plan, implement
a different one, and increase her utility by trading on her private infor-
mation and changing her consumption decisions. Our condition 5 implies
that at equilibrium the manager has no incentive to misreport and so there
is no asymmetric information between the manager and the shareholders.
Alternatively, we may assume that the manager does not announce a plan
and that the shareholders have expectations about manager’s choice. Un-
der this description of the model, condition 5 implies that shareholders’
expectations are consistent with the plan actually chosen by the manager.
Point 6 means that, under q̂, shareholders unanimously prefer ŷ to any
other plan y in Y. It is known that when markets are complete and share-
holders can directly choose production plans, unanimity holds. Our setting
is different, since the decision is delegated to a manager and shareholders
trade contingent claims on production. Note that the unanimity require-
ment does not seem too restrictive. It can be shown that under an ad-
ditional technical condition (namely, the differentiability of Φ), unanimity
holds in our setting whenever there exists at least one shareholder who
prefers ŷ to any other plan y in Y .
Given our equilibrium concept, we can highlight how the maximiza-
tion problem of our manager expressed in Equation (4) differs from what
appears in standard agency problems. First, our manager is maximizing
her indirect utility, which depends not only on her action but also on the
endogenous equilibrium price. Second, the manager’s consumption may
depend not only on her compensation but also on the possibility to trade
in the asset market. This implies that in the equilibrium definition, we
need to ensure that the manager has no incentive to announce a given
plan, implement a different one, and increase her utility by trading on her
private information and changing her consumption decisions.
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3 Equilibrium Properties
We start by analyzing the properties that equilibria should have.
3.1 Profit is maximized
We first show that at equilibrium, the price process q̂ should be strictly
positive, a standard property in equilibrium models. We then show that ŷ
should maximize q̂ · ŷ at price q̂ on Y , a property that implies the effi ciency
of ŷ.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption (P) holds and let (Φ, (ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ) be
an equilibrium. Then q̂  0 and q̂ · ŷ = maxY q̂ · y. Hence, ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y )
and NY (ŷ) = {λq̂, λ ≥ 0}.
When ŷ is implemented and under the price system q̂, q̂ · ŷ corresponds
to the market value of the firm’s production. As already underlined, this
resembles the well-known result that, in complete markets, shareholders
would agree on profit maximization. At the same time, the result is not
immediate in our setting. Profit maximization when the firm is run only
by shareholders need not be equivalent to maximizing shareholders’aggre-
gate dividend in our setting, as one needs to account also for the value of
manager’s compensation.
3.2 The compensation is linear
In this section we show that the equilibrium compensation is linear in the
following sense.
Definition 2 We say that the compensation is linear if there exists α ∈
[0, 1] such that
Φ(y) = αy for all y ∈ X+. (5)
Such a compensation will be denoted Φα.
For this purpose, we have to introduce the following definition and
additional assumption. For a given ȳ ∈ Y and a given t, we define Y (ȳ, t) =
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{y ∈ Y : (y0, ..., yt) = (ȳ0, ..., ȳt)} , the set of production plans whose first
t+ 1 coordinates coincide with those of ȳ.
Assumption (P4) For all ȳ ∈ Eff+(Y ) and p  0 such that NY (ȳ) =
{λp : λ ≥ 0} , NY (ȳ,t)(ȳ) = {q ∈ X ′ : ∃λ ≥ 0, qs = λps for s > t} , for all
t.
This condition is in the spirit of the constraint qualification condition
in convex optimization.14 This condition is obviously satisfied in Example
1 in which consumption only occurs at the terminal date.
The next theorem shows that at equilibrium, if it exists, the manager
receives a linear compensation.
Theorem 2 Suppose assumptions (P1) to (P4) hold and let (Φ, (ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ)
be an equilibrium. Then there exists 0 < α < 1 such that Φ = Φα.
To have an intuition of why the compensation scheme is linear, let us
consider the case where φt is differentiable (actually, we show in the proof
that this is the case almost everywhere). Notice that from our equilibrium
definition, the value of the manager’s compensation is maximal on Y+ at
ŷ. Hence, the marginal value of the manager’s compensation q̂Φ
′
(y) is
proportional to the equilibrium price q̂, which, by backward induction,
gives that the compensation Φ(y) is linear. This implies that the incomes
of the manager and of the shareholders are proportional to each other.
When prices are given the only feature of a compensation that matters
is its market value. However, in our general equilibrium setting, prices
are endogenous and depend in particular on the production plan chosen
by the manager, which in turn depends on her compensation. Hence, the
shape of the compensation matters and Theorem 2 states that this shape
is necessarily linear.
We also notice that the equilibrium compensation is determined up to
the scale parameter α, that could be made arbitrarily close to 0. In order to
pin down α, one could easily introduce a reservation utility for the manager
U∗ and assume that shareholders minimize the compensation cost. It would
then be immediate to show that the equilibrium level α̂ is fully determined
by the condition V m(ŷ, q̂) = U∗.
14It is easy to show that the inclusion {q ∈ X ′ : ∃λ ≥ 0, qs = λps for s > t} ⊂
NY (ȳ,t)(ȳ) is always satisfied.
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3.3 The manager does not trade
The manager does not trade in the financial market when her optimal
demand coincides with her compensation. In this case, her consumption
does not depend on asset prices, and therefore she does not benefit from
announcing a given plan and implementing a different one. Our next result
is that the manager truthfully reports the chosen plan ŷ only if she has no
incentive to trade her compensation Φ(ŷ) in the financial market. Hence,
at an equilibrium, if it exists, the manager’s consumption ĉm coincides with
her compensation. We call this the no-trade result, which we state in the
following:
Theorem 3 Suppose assumptions (P1) to (P4) hold. Let (Φα, (ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ)
be an equilibrium. Then the manager does not trade, in other words ĉm =
Φα(ŷ).
Let us give a sketch of the proof when there is only one period. Let
(Φα, (ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ) be an equilibrium. Then the manager receives αŷ. From
assertion 2 in Definition 1, ĉm maximizes Um(c) s.t. c ∈ C(ŷ), q̂ · c ≤ αq̂ · ŷ.
As we show that the constraint c ∈ C(ŷ) is not binding, the derivative of
the utility of the manager at ĉm is proportional to q̂. Furthermore, from




Condition (6) comes from the fact that by implementing a given y the
manager can change her consumption profile Ĉm(y) and that at equilibrium
she does not misreport her choice. From the first order conditions, the
derivative of Um(Ĉm(y)) at ŷ is also proportional to q̂. Hence the two
derivatives at ŷ must be proportional. As the marginal utility appears
on both sides, we have that Ĉm has a constant derivative. Therefore for
some a > 0, Ĉm(y) = ay for all y. From the manager’s budget constraint
aq̂ · ŷ = αq̂ · ŷ, hence a = α which means that the manager does not trade.
Notice that neither the no trade nor the linear compensation are require-
ments of the model, they result from the agency problem in our general
equilibrium setting.
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3.4 Relation to the production equilibrium
The aim of this subsection is to characterize the set of manager-shareholders
equilibria. To this end, we use the no-trade result to separate, for a given
share α of production given to the manager, the equilibrium construction
into two parts. On one side, the manager chooses the production plan ŷ
that maximizes Um(αy) on Y . On the other, the shareholders choose a
production plan as if they were running by themselves according to profit
maximization, a firm with production set (1 − α)Y . At equilibrium, the
manager’s and shareholders’choices should coincide. In order to state our
result, let us first recall the concept of production equilibrium associated
to a given production set. Note that in its definition, shareholders are not
constrained anymore to trade contingent claims that depend on production
plans, they may trade any contingent claim.
Definition 3 A production equilibrium associated to the production set Y
is given by a production process y∗, y∗ ∈ Y, a set of individual consumption
processes (c∗i)i ∈ XN and a price process q∗ ∈ X ′ such that
1. c∗i = argmaxU i(c), q∗ · c ≤ νi(q∗ · y∗) for all i,




The following theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of such a
production equilibrium.
Theorem 4 Suppose assumptions (P1), (P2) and (C) hold.
1. There exists a unique production equilibrium associated to Y denoted
by ((c∗i)i, q∗, y∗), with q∗  0.
2. For any α ∈ (0, 1), ((1−α)c∗i)i, q∗, (1−α)y∗) is the unique production
equilibrium associated to (1− α)Y .
The second assertion is a direct consequence of the first one using the
homogeneity of utilities. In both assertions, equilibrium prices are defined
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up to a multiplicative constant. The proof of Theorem 4 may be found in
Appendix 2.
In order to establish the link between the production equilibrium and
our concept of manager-shareholders equilibrium, we need the following
additional assumption.
Assumption (P5) The filtration F is generated by any y ∈ Eff+(Y ).
This is a completeness assumption which states that the market gener-
ated by all the contracts that are contingent on the values taken by y is
complete when y ∈ Eff+(Y ) and, in particular, for y = y∗. Indeed, as the
production equilibrium plan y∗ is profit maximizing and the equilibrium
price q∗ is strictly positive, y∗ ∈ Eff+(Y ). Under Assumption (P5), the
first item of the definition of a production equilibrium is equivalent to
c∗i = argmaxU i(c), c ∈ C(y∗), q∗ · c ≤ νi(q∗ · y∗), for all i,
which means that under Assumption (P5), the standard concept of pro-
duction equilibrium is equivalent to a concept of production equilibrium
with market constraints.15
From Theorems 2, 3 and Proposition 1, we obtain a characterization of
a manager-shareholders equilibrium.
Theorem 5 Suppose assumptions (P1) to (P5) and (C) hold. Let α ∈
(0, 1) be given. The list (Φα, (ĉi)i, αŷ, q̂, ŷ) is a manager-shareholders equi-
librium if and only if
1. the production plan ŷ maximizes Um(y) over Y,
2. the triple ((ĉi)i, q̂, (1 − α)ŷ) is the production equilibrium associated
to (1 − α)Y . Therefore, ĉi = (1 − α)c∗i for all i, q̂ = νq∗ for some
ν > 0 and ŷ = y∗.
15Note that this assumption is not necessary when all agents have homogeneous beliefs.
Indeed, in such a setting, it is easy to show that even if the agents can trade all possible
contracts and not only those that are contingent on the values taken by y, they will only
trade such contingent contracts (see Appendix 2).
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4 Equilibrium Manager
We next show that, for any 0 < α < 1, at the production equilibrium
associated to (1−α)Y , there is a representative shareholder independent of
α and we fully describe her characteristics. As standard, this is a fictitious
shareholder who - if endowed with the entire production - would have no
incentive to trade at equilibrium prices. We then derive the main result of
the paper: a necessary and suffi cient condition for the existence of manager-
shareholders equilibria is that the manager has the same characteristics as
the representative shareholder at equilibrium. We refer to such manager as
an equilibrium manager.






















Theorem 6 Suppose assumptions (P1), (P2) and (C) hold. Let ((c∗i)i, q∗, y∗)
be the production equilibrium associated to Y . Then:
1. There exists a unique vector of equilibrium utility weights (λ∗i) in Λ
and ν > 0 such that
λ∗iM it exp(−ρit)u′(c∗it ) = νq∗t for all t and all i. (7)
2. There is a representative shareholder with instantaneous utility u, a
density M̃ and a nonnegative discount rate process ρ̃ uniquely deter-
mined by:
exp(−ρ̃tt)M̃t = Nt(λ∗). (8)
3. The belief and discount rate of the representative shareholder at the
production equilibrium associated to (1− α)Y are independent of α.
Using Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we can now state the main result of
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the paper. The following theorem shows that a manager-shareholders equi-
librium exists if and only if the manager has the same belief and discount
rate as the representative shareholder.
Theorem 7 Suppose assumptions (P1) to (P5) and (C) hold. Let ((c∗i)i, q∗, y∗)
be the production equilibrium associated to Y . The family parametrized by
0 < α < 1, (Φα, ((1− α)c∗i))i, αy∗, q∗, y∗) is the unique family of manager-
shareholder equilibria if and only if (ρm,Mm) satisfies
exp(−ρmt)Mm,t = exp(−ρ̃tt)M̃t for all t ∈ T, (9)
which gives Mm,t = M̃t and ρm = ρ̃t for all t ∈ T.
5 Implications
In this section we discuss some implications of Theorem 7 in terms of the
characteristics (belief and discount rate) of the equilibrium manager as a
function of shareholders’characteristics.
5.1 Homogeneous shareholders
If all the shareholders have the same belief M and the same discount rate
ρ then, Nt(λ) = Mt exp(−ρt), which does not depend on λ. By condition
8, we have ρ̃ = ρ and M̃ = M and, by condition 9, the equilibrium exists
if and only if the manager has the same belief and discount rate as the
shareholders.
5.2 Heterogeneous discount rates
Suppose that all shareholders share the same belief as the manager, that
is M i = Mm for all i, but they have different discount rates. Then by
































Using the same argument as in Nocetti, Jouini and Napp (2008), we obtain
that ρ(t) is decreasing with limt→∞ ρ(t) = inf ρi. This means that there
is no constant solution ρm to equation (10) and that the manager has
necessarily a decreasing discount rate. This is due to the fact that aggregate
consumption in the distant future is mostly in the hands of more patient
shareholders. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 When all shareholders (including the manager) have the
same belief M and ρi 6= ρj for some (i, j), the equilibrium manager’s dis-
count rate must be decreasing over time.
A similar insight is derived by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005). They
focus on Pareto effi cient allocations in a setting with no uncertainty and no
production, and show that the representative shareholder has a decreasing
discount rate.16 Similarly, in a continuous time equilibrium setting with
heterogeneous beliefs and discount rates, Jouini et al. (2010) show that the
representative shareholder discount rate cannot be constant and converges
asymptotically to the lowest individual discount rate. In our setting, this
means that the equilibrium manager behaves in the long run as the most
patient shareholder.17
Note that we assumed in Section 2.3 that the manager has a constant
discount rate. If we maintain this assumption, Proposition 8 can be seen
as an impossibility result: in a setting where all the shareholders have the
same belief and where at least two shareholders have different discount
16They show this is the case when all agents have constant discount rates and de-
creasing absolute risk aversions, which is the case in our framework.
17We cannot derive such a result directly from the equations above because our model
has a finite horizon and changing T leads to a possible change in the equilibrium weights(
λ∗i
)
. In Appendix 3, we show that ρ(T ) approaches inf ρi when T is suffi ciently large
in a sense made precise.
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rates, whatever the belief and the constant discount rate of the manager,
there is no manager-shareholders equilibrium.
5.3 Heterogeneous beliefs
Suppose instead that all shareholders have the same constant discount rate
but different beliefs and γ 6= 0. Then by condition (9) the belief and


























When applied to equation (11), this leads to ρm ≥ ρ, the inequality being
strict when there are at least two shareholders with different beliefs and
γ 6= 0. The equilibrium manager has a higher discount rate than any of
the shareholder when γ ≤ 0. The opposite inequality, ρm ≤ ρ is obtained
for γ > 0. We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If γ 6= 0, when all shareholders have the same discount
rate ρ and M i 6= M j for some (i, j), then we must have ρm > ρ when γ < 0
and ρm < ρ when γ > 0.
If we introduce the consumption discount rate ρm,c, defined as
exp(−ρmt)u(ct) = u(exp(−ρm,ct)ct),
then ρm,c = 1γρm and the manager’s consumption discount rate is always
lower than the shareholders common discount rate. That is, the man-




In order to derive some properties about the equilibrium manager belief,
let us specify further shareholders’beliefs. Let us assume that T = 1 and
that the production set is characterized by a given random variable with
normal distribution x̃ ∼ N (µ, σ2). For instance, this could correspond to
the situation where the manager chooses the degree of exposure (level of
volatility) to a given exogenous risk, the mean return being a function of
the chosen degree of exposure.
Let us assume that all shareholders agree about the normality of x̃
as well as about its variance σ2 but that shareholder i believes that x̃ ∼








Let us assume that the distribution of the µi’s is symmetric with respect
to the objective µ which is the case, for instance, with a large number of
shareholders when the µi’s result from the observation of a noisy signal
around µ. Let us also assume that the λ∗i as a function of µi is also















1−γ is symmetric with respect to µ and increasing after µ,
it is easy to show that manager’s belief is a mean preserving spread of the
objective belief. Let Em and V arm denote respectively the expected value
and the variance from the manager point of view, Qm and Qi the manager’s
and shareholders’subjective probabilities andSSD second order stochastic
dominance. We have






Therefore, the equilibrium manager overestimates the level of exogenous
risk.
18The distribution of the (λ∗i) depends on the distribution of shares (νi). This as-
sumption is then an assumption on the distribution of shares.
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5.4 Heterogeneous discount rates and beliefs
We now consider a setting in which both beliefs and discount rates are
heterogeneous. In this section we set γ = 0 (logarithmic utility). From




λ∗i exp(−ρit)M it , for every t ∈ T, (13)
which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Suppose that γ = 0 and M is 6= M js for some (i, j) and
some s ∈ T . If the number of dates t ∈ T such that t > s is not smaller than
the number of shareholders with distinct discount rates, then the equilibrium
manager must have a non deterministic discount rate.
Similarly to Proposition 8, Proposition 10 can be seen as an impossi-
bility result if one maintains the assumption that manager has a constant
discount rate. In a logarithmic setting where at least two shareholders
have different beliefs and with a suffi ciently large number of dates, what-
ever the belief and the constant discount rate of the manager, there is no
manager-shareholders equilibrium.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
A key result of our analysis is that a manager-shareholders equilibrium
exists if and only if the manager has the same characteristics as the repre-
sentative shareholder at equilibrium. This result implies a precise mapping
between shareholders’and manager’s characteristics, as we have character-
ized in Section 5. The flip side of these results is that finding an equilibrium
manager may be diffi cult in settings in which such characteristics are hard
to observe or in which they are constrained to be "similar" to those of
shareholders.
In the context of Proposition 8, for example, one can see that it is not
possible to find an equilibrium manager in the set of shareholders with
constant discount rates, even though all shareholders have constant dis-
count rates. Similarly, in Proposition 9, the equilibrium manager cannot
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be defined among shareholders with discount rate ρ, even though all share-
holders have discount rate ρ. An implication is that, in order to overcome
such impossibility, it is necessary to enrich the contracting space and allow
shareholders to restrict the manager’ability to trade in the asset market.
In such a framework and in a companion paper (Bianchi et al. (2020)), we
investigate whether a manager-shareholders equilibrium could be achieved
by imposing trading restrictions to the manager. We also analyze how the
equilibrium compensation could be used to align the marginal utility of the
manager to that of the representative shareholder at the equilibrium plan,
and whether that would require departing from the linear compensation
found in Section 3.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1. Proofs
The following Lemma will be useful in the next. In particular, when some
consumption plan c does not satisfy the market constraints c ∈ C(y) for
some y ∈ Y , the Lemma establishes that the market constraints are satisfied
for some slight perturbation of y.
Lemma 11 For (x, x′) ∈ X2+ and ε > 0, there exists x′′ ∈ X+ such that
‖x′ − x′′‖ < ε and C(x) ⊂ C(x′′). Furthermore,
1. if x and x′ are in Y, we can take x′′ such that x′′ ∈ Y+,
2. if xτ = x′τ for τ = 0, ..., t then we can take x
′′ such that xτ = x′τ = x
′′
τ
for τ = 0, ..., t.
Proof. Let (x, x′) ∈ X2+ and let α > 0. Let sn = n + 1 for n ≥ 0
and sn = 1−n+1 for n ≤ 0. The family S = (sn)n∈Z is an ordered family
with lim∞ sn = ∞ and lim−∞ sn = 0. Let z and z′ be nonnegative real
numbers. If z′ > 0, there exits n ∈ Z such that sn ≤ z′ < sn+1 and we
define h by h(z, z′) = sn − (sn − sn−1) z1+z . We have 0 < sn−1 < h(z, z
′) ≤
sn ≤ z′ and |h(z, z′)− z′| < 2. If z′ = 0, we take h(z, 0) = 0 and we
still have h(z, z′) ≤ z′. If 0 < ε < 1 is given and if εz + (1 − ε)z′ 6= 0,
then |h(z, εz + (1− ε)z′)− z′| < 2 + ε |z − z′| . If εz + (1 − ε)z′ = 0 then
z = z′ = 0 and we still have |h(z, εz + (1− ε)z′)− z′| < 2 + ε |z − z′| .
Let us suppose now that we know h(z, εz + (1 − ε)z′) without knowing z
nor z′. If h(z, εz + (1 − ε)z′) = 0 we necessarily have εz + (1 − ε)z′ = 0
and from there z = 0. If h(z, εz + (1 − ε)z′) > 0, the inequalities sn−1 <
h(z, εz + (1 − ε)z′) ≤ sn uniquely define a pair (sn, sn−1) and from there
z is uniquely determined by the equation h(z, z′) = sn − (sn − sn−1) z1+z .













∣∣∣xtε − x′tε ∣∣∣) ≤ ε (2 + |xt − x′t|) and if we take ε suffi ciently small, we
have ‖x′ − x′′‖ < ε. Furthermore, knowing x′′t permits to determine xt and
we have C(x) ⊂ C(x′′). Finally, we have seen that h(z, z′) ≤ z′ and then
0 ≤ x′′ ≤ εx+ (1− ε)x′ ∈ Y+ by convexity of Y+. We have then x′′ ∈ Y+.
It is clear that when xτ = x′τ , it suffi ces to take x
′′
τ = xτ = x
′
τ instead











Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first show that q̂  0. Indeed if
for some t, q̂t = 0 on a set A of positive measure, the shareholders’and
manager’s demand could be arbitrarily large on A violating assertion 3 of
the definition of equilibrium.
Assume that there exists y′ ∈ Y+ such that q̂ · y′ > q̂ · ŷ. By Lemma 11,
there exists y′′ close to y′ such that q̂ ·y′′ > q̂ · ŷ and C(ŷ) ⊂ C(y′′). We have
then either q̂ · Φ(y′′) > q̂ · Φ(ŷ) or q̂ · (y′′ − Φ(y′′)) > q̂ · (ŷ − Φ(ŷ)). From
the definition of the indirect utility, we have either Vm(y′′, q̂) > Vm(ŷ, q̂) or
V i(y′′, q̂) > V i(ŷ, q̂)which violates assertion 4 or assertion 6 of the definition
of equilibrium. Therefore, q̂ · ŷ = maxY+ q̂ · Φ(y). Since q̂  0, q̂ · ŷ =
maxY q̂ · Φ(y), ŷ ∈ Eff+(Y ) and NY (ŷ) = {λq̂, λ ≥ 0}.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof requires different steps.
Step 1. Date−T compensation zT → φT (z0, ..., zT ) and net production
zT → zT − φT (z0, ..., zT ) are nondecreasing in zT .
The idea of this step is very simple. If the compensation is lower at
z′ than at z < z′, then for any plan y, the manager prefers to realize a
modification y′ of y rather than y itself where y′ takes the same values
as y except that y′ takes the value z whenever y takes the value z′. Since
y′ ≤ y, it is attainable whenever y is attainable. But since such a plan y′
is dominated, manager’s choice will not be accepted by shareholders. The
treatment of zT → zT − φT (z0, ..., zT ) is symmetric. The technicalities of
the proof are due to 1. the multiple dates setting, 2. the fact that we have
to deal with measurable modifications on nonzero measure sets, and 3. the
modifications should be made such that C(y) = C(y′).
In order to show that date−T manager’s compensation φT (z0, ..., zT )
and the net production zT → zT −φT (z0, ..., zt−1, zt) are nondecreasing, we
have to first provide a definition of monotonicity that is robust to the fact
that the considered functions can be modified on a 0 measure set without
modifying the behavior of the manager nor those of the shareholders.
Definition A function ϕ : R→ R is nondecreasing a.e. if
µ2
({
(z, z′) ∈ R2 : (z − z′)(ϕ(z)− ϕ(z′)) < 0
})
= 0.
Let us show that, for almost all (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ RT+, both functions
zT → φT (z0, ..., zT ) and zT → zT − φT (z0, ..., zt) are nondecreasing a.e.
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By definition of the conditional expectation, there exists Q such that
E [ q̂| ŷ] = Q(ŷ). Since q̂  0, P−a.e., we have Q > 0 µ−a.e. Furthermore,
it is immediate that, for almost every (z0, ..., zT ) ∈ RT+1+ , we have
E [ q̂T | (ŷ0, ..., ŷT−1) = (z0, ..., zT−1) and ŷT ∈ [zT − ε, zT + ε)]
=
∫
u∈[zT−ε,zT+ε) hy(z0, ..., zT−1, u)Q(z0, ..., zT−1, u)du∫
u∈[zT−ε,zT+ε) hy(z0, ..., zT−1, u)du
→
ε→0
Q(z0, ..., zT ).
Let us assume that zT → φT (z0, ..., zT ) is not nondecreasing and, for
each (z0, ..., zT−1), let
A(z0, ..., zT−1) ={
(zT , z
′
T ) ∈ R2+ : (zT − z′T )(φT (z0, ..., zT−1, zT )− φT (z0, ..., zT−1, z′T )) < 0
}
.
We have, µ2 (A(z0, ..., zT−1)) > 0 for all (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B for some Borel-





where C is the Borel-measurable set of continuity points of φT for which
we further have hy > 0 and Q > 0. Hence, we may modify A and B in
order to have (z0, ..., zT ) and (z0, ..., z′T ) in C for all (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B and
(zT , z
′
T ) ∈ A(z0, ..., zT−1).
For (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B, there exists then (a, b) ∈ A(z0, ..., zT−1).We may
assume a < b and then
φa
def
= φT (z0, ..., zT−1, a) > φT (z0, ..., zT−1, b)
def
= φb.
For η > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that |φT (z0, ..., zT−1, z)− φa| < η for
z ∈ I = [a− ε, a+ ε) and
∣∣φT (z0, ..., zT−1, z)− φb∣∣ < η for z ∈ J =
[b− ε, b+ ε). If η and ε are chosen such that η < φa−φb
2
and ε < b−a
2
,
we have I < J and φT (z0, ..., zT−1, I) > φT (z0, ..., zT−1, J). Since I, J , a
and b depend on z = (z0, ..., zT−1), we denote them by Iz, Jz, az and bz.
Let (α, β, α′, β′) be rational numbers such that α < β < α′ < β′ and let
B(α, β, α′, β′) =
{z ∈ B : α ∈ [az − ε, az) , β ∈ [az, az + ε) , α′ ∈ [bz − ε, bz) , β′ ∈ [bz, bz + ε)} .
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It is easy to check thatB = ∪α,β,α′,β′B(α, β, α′, β′). As the set of (α, β, α′, β′)
is countable, there exists (ᾱ, β̄, ᾱ′, β̄′) such that µT−1(B(ᾱ, β̄, ᾱ′, β̄′)) > 0.
Let a and b and ε be suffi ciently small so that we further have [a− ε, a+ ε) ⊂[
ᾱ, β̄
)




. From now on, we denote by B′ the
set B(ᾱ, β̄, ᾱ′, β̄′), by I ′ the interval [a− ε, a+ ε) and by J ′ the interval
[b− ε, b+ ε) . By considering a possibly smaller B′ of positive measure, we
may assume (without loss of generality) that φT is continuous at (z0, ..., zT−1, a)
and at (z0, ..., zT−1, b) for all (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B′.
The intervals I ′ and J ′ do not depend on (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B and we have
I ′ < J ′ and φT (z0, ..., zT−1, I ′) > φT (z0, ..., zT−1, J ′) for all (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈
B′.
Let f : R → R \ J ′ be defined by f(z) = 1
2
(a− ε) + 1
2
z on I ′, f(z) =
a+ 1
2
(z − b+ ε) on J ′ and f(z) = z elsewhere. We have f(z) ≤ z for all z
and f admits an inverse denoted by g.
Let the process ỹ be defined by (ỹ1, ..., ỹT ) = (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1, f(ŷT )) when
(ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1) ∈ B′ and (ỹ1, ..., ỹT ) = (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1, ŷT ) elsewhere. As ỹ ≤
ŷ, ỹ ∈ Y. By definition of g, we have (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1, ŷT ) = (ỹ1, ..., ỹT−1, g(ỹT ))
when (ỹ1, ..., ỹT−1) ∈ B′ and (ŷ1, ..., ŷT ) = (ỹ1, ..., ỹT ) elsewhere. Hence ŷ
and ỹ generate then the same information structure and C(ỹ) = C(ŷ).
Observe that for (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1) ∈ B′, if ŷT ∈ I ′, then ỹT ∈ I ′ and
|φT (ŷ1, ..., ŷT )− φT (ỹ1, ..., ỹT )| < 2η,
if ŷT ∈ J ′, then ỹT ∈ I ′ and φT (ŷ1, ..., ŷT )− φ(ỹ1, ..., ỹT ) < φ(b)− φ(a) + 2η
and, we have φ(ŷ) = φ(ỹ) elsewhere. Therefore, for (z0, ..., zT−1) ∈ B′, we
have
E(z0,...,zT−1) [q̂TφT (ŷ)− q̂TφT (ỹ)]
2ε
<
2ηP(z0,...,zT−1)(ŷT ∈ I ′ ∪ J ′)E(z0,...,zT−1) [ q̂T | ŷT ∈ I ′ ∪ J ′]
2ε
+




2η (h(z0, ..., zT−1, a) + h(z0, ..., zT−1, b))Q(z0, ..., zT−1a)
+ (φT (z0, ..., zT−1, b)− φT (z0, ..., zT−1, a))h(z0, ..., zT−1, b)Q(z0, ..., zT−1b)
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where E(z0,...,zT−1) and P(z0,...,zT−1) correspond, respectively, to the expec-
tation and to the probability conditional to (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1) = (z0, ..., zT−1).
Since φT (z0, ..., zT−1, b) − φT (z0, ..., zT−1, a) < 0, for η and ε suffi ciently




(z0, ..., zT−1) /∈ B′ and (ŷ1, ..., ŷT−1) = (z0, ..., zT−1), we have ŷ = ỹ and
E(z0,...,zT−1)[q̂TφT (ŷ)−q̂TφT (ỹ)]
2ε
= 0. Since µT−1(B′) > 0, by the law of iterated
expectations, we obtain E [q̂TφT (ŷ)] < E [q̂TφT (ỹ)] and q̂ · Φ(ŷ) < q̂ · Φ(ỹ).
Since C(ỹ) = C(ŷ), we have V m(q̂, ỹ) > V m(q̂, ŷ) which is impossible.
The function Id− φT is treated similarly, using V i instead of V m.
Step 2. Differentiability
Since zT → φT (z1, ..., zT ) and zT → zT−φT (z1, ..., zT ) are nondecreasing
then zT → φT (z1, ..., zT ) is 1-Lipshitz and then differentiable a.e.
Step 3. Linearity at date T
Let us show that q̂ · Φ(ŷ) = maxY (ŷ,T−1) q̂ · Φ(y). Assume that there
exists y′ ∈ Y (ŷ, T − 1)+ such that q̂ · Φ(y′) > q̂ · Φ(ŷ). By Lemma 11
and by continuity of φT , there exists y′′ ∈ Y (ŷ, T − 1) close to y′ such
that q̂ · Φ(y′′) > q̂ · Φ(ŷ) and C(ŷ) ⊂ C(y′′). From the definition of the
indirect utility, we have Vm(y′′, q̂) > Vm(ŷ, q̂) which violates assertion 4 of
the definition of equilibrium. We have then q̂ ·Φ(ŷ) = maxY (ŷ,T−1) q̂ ·Φ(y).
From Proposition 1, NY (ŷ) = {αq̂, α > 0} and by Assumption P4, we have
then NY (ŷ,T−1)(y) = {(q0, ..., qT−1, αq̂T ) : α > 0}. As φT is differentiable




(ŷ0, . . . , ŷT ) = αq̂T (14)




(z0, . . . , zT ) = α, ∀z ∈ RT+1+ .
Integrating with respect to zT , we get that for some functions H : RT+ → R
φT (z0, . . . , zT ) = αzT +H(z0, . . . , zT−1). (15)
Since φT (z0, . . . , zT ) ≤ zT , φT (z0, . . . , zT−1, 0) = 0. Setting zT = 0 in
equation (15), we obtain that H = 0 and φT (z0, . . . , zT ) = αzT .
Step 4. Backward induction
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The first step above relies, in particular, on the fact that zT only in-
tervenes in φT and not in φt for t 6= T. Due to Step 3, we know now that
zT−1 does not intervene in φT and hence only intervenes in φT−1. We may
then apply the above methodology to prove that φT−1 is nondecreasing
and then differentiable a.e. Similarly, the first order condition with respect
to zT−1 only involves φT−1 and is similar to 14 replacing T by T − 1. We
obtain that φT−1(z0, . . . , zT−1) = αzT−1 and by backward induction, we
obtain that φt(z0, . . . , zt) = αzt for all t and all (z0, . . . , zt) ∈ Rt+1+ . As
0 ≤ Φ(y) ≤ y, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Step 5. 0 < α < 1
Note that α = 0 leads to V m(y, q̂) independent of y which is not compat-
ible with the 4th equilibrium condition. Similarly, α = 1 leads to V i(y, q̂)
independent of y which is not compatible with the 6th equilibrium condi-
tion.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (Φ, (ĉi)i, ĉm, q̂, ŷ) be an equilibrium. From
Theorem 2, Φ = Φα for some α s.t. 0 < α < 1. Let us first show that
Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(ĉm) = max{Um(c), q̂ · c ≤ q̂ · Φ(ŷ)} or, in other words, that
we can relax the condition c ∈ C(ŷ). If this is not the case, there exists c
such that q̂ · c ≤ q̂ ·Φ(ŷ) and Um(c) > Um(ĉm). As Um is homogeneous, for
ε small enough, we have q̂ · (1− ε)c < q̂ ·Φ(ŷ) and Um((1− ε)c) > Um(ĉm).
By continuity of q · Φ, let ε > 0 such that |q̂ · Φ(ŷ)− q̂ · Φ(y)| < q̂ · Φ(ŷ)−
q̂ · (1 − ε)c for all y such that ‖y − ŷ‖ < ε. By Lemma 11, there exists
y ∈ X+ such that y << ŷ, ‖y − ŷ‖ < ε and C((1 − ε)c) ⊂ C(y). We
have then y ∈ Y+, (1 − ε)c ⊂ C(y) and q̂ · (1 − ε)c < q̂ · Φ(y) which gives
Vm(y, q̂) ≥ Um((1− ε)c) > Um(ĉm) = Vm(ŷ, q̂) which contradicts Condition
4 in the definition of a manager-shareholders equilibrium.
Therefore, there exists λ > 0 such that
α exp(−ρmt)Mm,tu′(ĉm,t) = λq̂t, for all t. (16)





exp(−ρmt)E[Mm,tu(Ĉm,t(y0, . . . , yt)] = Um(Ĉm(ŷ)).
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Let us show that Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT−1, zT ) is nondecreasing in zT . The
proof is similar to the proof of Step 1 in Theorem 2 and we only provide a
sketch of it. Let (z0, . . . , zT−1) ∈ RT+ be given and let us define C̃(zT ) by
C̃(zT )
def
= Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT−1, zT ).
Let A =
{
(z, z′) ∈ R2+ : (z − z′)(C̃(z)− C̃(z′)) < 0
}
and let us assume
that µ⊗µ (A) > 0. By Fubini, there exists z such that µ (B) > 0 with B ={
z′ > z : C̃(z) > C̃(z′))
}
. Let us consider ŷ′ such that ŷ′ = (z0, . . . , zT−1, z)
when ŷ = (z0, . . . , zT−1, z′T ) with z
′
T ∈ B and ŷ′ = ŷ elsewhere. We
have ŷ′ ≤ ŷ and then ŷ′ ∈ Y and Ĉm,T (ŷ′) > Ĉm,T (ŷ). If we were able
do that for a set of (z0, . . . , zT−1) with positive measure then we would
obtain a contradiction with the fact that ŷ maximizes Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) on Y.
Hence, for almost all (z0, . . . , zT−1) ∈ RT+, we have µ ⊗ µ (A) = 0 which
means that Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT−1, zT ) is nondecreasing a.e. in zT for almost all
(z0, . . . , zT−1) ∈ RT+ and Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT−1, zT ) admits a partial derivative
with respect to zT almost everywhere.
From the first order conditions and Proposition 1 item 1, there exists







(ŷ0, . . . , ŷs) exp(−ρms)Mm,su′(ĉm,s)
]
= νq̂t for all t. (17)











for some a > 0. In particular, at date T ,
∂Ĉm,T
∂yT
(ŷ0, . . . , ŷT ) = a.
As ŷ takes all possible values in RT+1+ , we have
∂Ĉm,T
∂xT
(z0, . . . , zT ) = a, ∀z ∈ RT+1+ .
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Integrating with respect to zT , we obtain
Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT ) = azT +H(z0, . . . , zT−1), (19)
for some functions H : RT+ → R. Since Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT ) ≤ zT , if zT = 0
Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT ) = 0. Setting zT = 0 in the previous equation, we obtain
that H = 0 and
Ĉm,T (z0, . . . , zT ) = azT , ∀(z0, . . . , zT ) ∈ RT+1+ . (20)
Similarly, considering next Equation (18) at t = T − 1, we obtain
Ĉm,T−1(z0, . . . , zT−1) = azT−1.
By backward induction, we obtain that Ĉm,t(z0, . . . , zt) = azt for all t and
all (z0, . . . , zt) ∈ Rt+1+ , and using the equality q̂ · Ĉm(ŷ) = q̂ · αŷ, that
a = α or Ĉm = Φα. Therefore, irrespective of the production process and
of the history, the consumption of the manager at t coincides with her
compensation at t; that is, the manager does not trade in the financial
market.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof of assertion 1 may be found in
Appendix 2. To prove assertion 2, from assertion 1, there exists a unique
equilibrium associated to (1− α)Y . From the homogeneity of preferences,
one directly checks that ((1−α)c∗i)i, q∗, (1−α)y∗) solves the three properties
of a production equilibrium associated to (1− α)Y .
Proof of Theorem 5. Let 0 < α < 1 be given and (Φα, (ĉi)i, αŷ, q̂, ŷ)
be a manager-shareholders equilibrium. To prove assertion 1, from asser-
tion 2 of Definition 1 and from Theorems 2 and 3, we have, for some α such
that 0 < α < 1,
Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(Ĉm(ŷ)) = Um(αŷ).
As Vm(y, q̂) ≥ Um(αy) for all y ∈ Y , from assertion 4 of Definition 1, we
have
Vm(ŷ, q̂) = Um(αŷ) ≥ Vm(y, q̂) ≥ Um(αy),∀y ∈ Y,
proving the desired assertion. To prove assertion 2, from assertion 1 of
Definition 1 and Assumption (P5), ĉi maximizes U i(c) s.t. q̂ · c ≤ νi(q̂ ·
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((1− α)ŷ)), hence the first item of the definition of a production equilib-
rium associated to (1− α)Y is verified. From Proposition 1, q̂ · (1− α)ŷ ≥
q̂ · (1 − α)y for all y ∈ Y . Lastly from Theorems 2 and 3 and assertion 3
of the definition of a production equilibrium,
∑
i ĉ
i = (1− α)ŷ. Therefore
((ĉi)i, q̂, (1−α)ŷ) is the production equilibrium associated to (1−α)Y and
from Theorem 4, ĉi = (1 − α)c∗i for all i, q̂ = νq∗ for some ν > 0 and
ŷ = y∗.
Conversely, let us assume that Assertions 1 and 2 of Theorem 5 are sat-
isfied. By definition of the production equilibrium, the plan c∗i maximizes
U i under the budget constraint q̂· c ≤ νiq̂·y∗ hence ĉi = (1−α)c∗i maximizes
U i under the budget constraint q̂· c ≤ νiq̂ · (1 − α)y∗ = νiq̂ · (ŷ − Φα(ŷ)).
Furthermore, by Assumption P5, C(ŷ) = X. Then, Condition 1 in Defini-
tion 1 is satisfied. The same reasoning applies to Condition 2. By definition
of the production equilibrium, we have
∑
i ĉ
i = (1−α)ŷ which immediately
gives Condition 3. Assertion 1 of Theorem 5 is equivalent to Condition 5.
Let y ∈ Y, by definition of the production equilibrium, we have q̂ · y ≤ q̂ · ŷ.
If q̂ · y = q̂ · ŷ, the strict convexity from above gives the existence of y′ in




ŷ and, since q  0, q̂ · y′ > q̂ · ŷ which contradicts
the definition of the production equilibrium. We have then q̂ · y < q̂ · ŷ
and since C(ŷ) = X, by strict monotonicity of the utility function, we have
Vm(ŷ, q̂) > Vm(y, q̂). Therefore, Condition 4 is satisfied. Condition 6 is
derived similarly.
Proof of Theorem 6. To prove assertion 1, from Theorem 4, there ex-
ists a unique production equilibrium associated to Y denoted by ((c∗i)i, q∗, y∗)
with q∗ defined up to a multiplicative constant. The vector of equilibrium
utility weights (λ∗i)i in Λ and the scaling constant ν > 0 are uniquely de-
fined by the shareholder’s first order conditions at equilibrium given by (7).
To prove assertion 2, from Equation (21), the representative shareholder’s











and M̃t+1 = Nt+1(λ∗) exp (ρ̃t+1(t+ 1)) .




is a martingale and we
have exp(−ρ̃tt)M̃t = Nt(λ∗). Furthermore, this decomposition is unique.
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Indeed, if exp(−ρ̃1t t)M̃1t = exp(−ρ̃2t t)M̃2t , then taking the expectation for
t = 1, we obtain ρ̃11 = ρ̃
2




2 . If we take now the














and since M̃11 = M̃
2









induction, we get M̃1 = M̃2 and ρ̃1 = ρ̃2.
To prove the last assertion, at the production equilibrium associated to
(1 − α)Y , the utility weights and να > 0 are defined by the first order
conditions λ∗iM it exp(−ρit)u′((1 − α)c∗it ) = ναq∗t for all t and all i which
defines the same equilibrium utility weights in Λ, hence the same N(λ∗)
and the same representative shareholder utility.
Proof of Theorem 7. From Theorem 5, the manager maximizes
Um(αy) over Y . Therefore she chooses y∗ if and only if the process
(exp(−ρmt)Mm,tu′(αy∗)t∈T ∈ NY (y∗) = {νq∗, ν > 0}.
Moreover q∗ is proportional to the marginal utility of the representative
shareholder at equilibrium. Using the homogeneity of u, we must have, for
some ν > 0 and for every t
(exp(−ρmt)Mm,tu′(y∗t ) = ν exp(−ρ̃tt)M̃tu′(y∗t )
Cancelling u′(y∗t ), on both sides and setting t = 0, we obtain ν = 1 and
(9).
Since Mm,t and M̃t are martingales and ρ̃t is predictable, we have ρm =
ρ̃t for all t and Mm = M̃ by the uniqueness of such a decomposition as
proven in Theorem 6.
Proof of Propositions 8 and 9. The proof of Proposition 8 may be


















































































for all i and let f defined by f(x) =
∑N
j=1 λjx
bj . We have f(ai) = 0




Therefore, there exists (a11, ..., a
1
N−1) such that a
1
i ∈ (ai, ai+1) and g′(a1i ) = 0
for i = 1, ..., N − 1. We have g′(x) =
∑N
j=2 λj(bj − b1)xbj−b1−1 and then
g1(a1i ) = 0 for i = 1, ..., N−1 with g1(x) =
∑N
j=2 λj(bj−b1)xbj−b2 . Therefore,
there exists (a21, ..., a
2








and (g1)′ (a2i ) = 0 for
i = 1, ..., N − 2 or g2(a2i ) = 0 for i = 1, ..., N − 2 with g2(x) =
∑N
j=3 λj(bj−
b1)(bj − b2)xbj−b3 . By iteration, we have aN−11 > gN−1(aN−11 ) = 0 with
gN−1(x) =
∑N
j=N λj(bj−b1)(bj−b2)...(bj−bN−1))xbj−bN which gives λN(bN−
b1)(bN − b2)...(bN − bn−1) = 0 or λn = 0. By iteration, we obtain λN−1 = 0
and then λj = 0 for j = 1, ..., N.
Proof of Proposition 10. When dealing with equation (13), if two
shareholders i and j have the same time discount rate, we may replace them
by a single shareholder with the same discount rate, the belief λ
∗iM i+λ∗jMj
λ∗i+λ∗j
and a weight λ∗i + λ∗j. Hence, we will assume without loss of generality
that ρi 6= ρj for all (i, j) with i 6= j. We further assume that ρ1 > ... > ρN .
Since there are at least N dates t ∈ T such that t > s, let (t1, ..., tN) be
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such that tN > ... > t1 > s > 0. Let us assume that ρm is deterministic and
let us take the conditional (to s) expectations in (13) for t = tj, j = 1, ...N .





Let X(ω) = (λ∗1M1s (ω), , ..., λ
∗NMNs (ω) and A = (exp(−ρitj))j,i. Then
AX(ω) = Mm,s(ω)Y with Y =(exp(−ρm,t1t1), ..., exp(−ρm,tN tN)). From
Lemma 12 with ai = exp(−ρi) and bj = tj, the matrix (exp(−ρitj))i,j
is invertible and so is A and we have X(ω) = Mm,s(ω)A−1Y. Taking
the expectation, we have Λ = A−1Y with Λ = (λ∗1, , ...λ∗N). Hence
X(ω) = Mm,s(ω)Λ and therefore M is(ω) = Mm,s(ω) for all i which con-
tradicts our heterogeneous beliefs assumption.
7.2 Appendix 2. Existence of a Production Equilib-
rium and Related Results
Existence of a production equilibrium is proven by a Negishi utility weights
method. The proof of uniqueness extends Dana (1995) by introducing
time, processes and a production set and is based on our assumption that
shareholders have proportional endowments (no other endowments than
their shares of the firm) and homogeneous utility indices (same CRRA
instantaneous utility function for all shareholders).
Concepts, notations and first results
In this appendix, we assume that (P1), (P2) and (C) are fulfilled.
Let Y+ = Y ∩ X+ and Yς = {y ∈ Y+ | y ≥ ς}. From (P2), the sets Y
and Y+ and Yς are closed and convex and from (P1) (P2), Y+ and Yς are
bounded, hence σ(X,X ′) compact.
Definition 4 An allocation (c1, . . . , cN , y) is the specification of a con-
sumption plan ci ∈ X+ for each shareholder i = 1, . . . , N and of a pro-




We first recall the following classical characterization of Pareto optima.
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Lemma 13 An allocation (c1, . . . , cN , y) is a Pareto optimum if and only
if there exists λ ∈ RN+ , such that (c1, . . . , cN) solves
max
{∑
λiU i(ci), ci ≥ 0 for all i,
∑
ci = y, y ∈ Y+
}
.
In order to compute explicitly Pareto optima, let us next introduce
some notations. For t ∈ T, c ∈ R+ and λ ∈ RN+ , let u(c, λ) and (Ci(c, λ))i
be defined by
u(t, c, λ) = max
{∑
i





Ci(t, c, λ) = arg max
{∑
i















One easily verifies that
u(c, λ) = N(λ)u(c), (21)














represents shareholder’s i stochastic share
of c. For any (ω, t, λ), the function u(ω, t, ·, λ) is differentiable with respect
to c on ]0,∞[ and we have
uc(c, λ) = N(λ)u
′(c). (23)
From lemma 13, the allocation (c1, . . . , cI , y) is a Pareto optimum if and
only if there exists λ ∈ RI+, such that y ∈ Y+ solves the representative









and cit = C
i(t, y, λ) for all i. As u(t, ·, λ) is increasing, the maximiza-
tion may be restricted to Yς . As u(t, c, ·) is homogeneous of degree 1,
Ci(t, c, ·) is homogeneous of degree 0 for all i and we may restrict attention
to Λ =
{













x : Mix ∈ L1
(
Ω, (Ft)t∈T , P
)}
for all i and XM
def
= ∩iXMi .
Let X ′M =
{
Mp, p ∈ L∞
(





x ∈ XM and Mp ∈ X ′M , let x ·Mp =:
∑T
t=0E(Mtptxt) = Mp · x.
Let L1 denote L1
(
Ω, (Ft)t∈T , P
)
and L∞ denote L∞
(
Ω, (Ft)t∈T , P
)
.
We denote by⇀ the convergence with respect to σ(X,X ′) and by⇀M the
convergence with respect to the topology σ(XM , X ′M). Note that wn ⇀M w
if and only if Mwn →Mw with respect to the topology σ(L1, L∞). Let
V = {v = u(y) : y ∈ Yς} .
By Assumptions (C) and (P1), for any y ∈ Yς ,
|u(y)| ≤ |u(Ξ)|+ |u(ς)| def= A ∈ XM . (24)
Therefore, V ⊂ XM .
Pareto Optima and Equilibria with transfers
We start by proving a lemma which will be useful in many proofs.
Lemma 14 1. There exists a > 0 such that |N (λ)| ≤ aM ∈ X ′M .
2. For (λn) ⊂ Λ such that λn → λ′, we have N (λn) → N (λ′) for
σ(X ′M , XM).
3. If (yn) ⊂ Yς and yn →a.e. y′, then u(yn) ⇀M u(y′). Let (vn) ⊂ V
vn →a.e. v′ and λn → λ′, then N (λn) vn →L1 N (λ′) v′.






is bounded over the simplex of Rn ,








i |bi|. We then
have Nt (λ) ≤ a (
∑
i (λ
iM it exp(−ρit))) ≤ aMt and N (λ) ∈ X ′M .
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2. For λn → λ′ and w ∈ XM we have wN (λn) →a.e. wN (λ′) and
|wN (λn)| ≤ aM |w| ∈ L1. By Lebesgue Theorem, we then havewN (λn)→L1
wN (λ′) for all w ∈ XM .
3. If yn →a.e. y′, for x ∈ X ′M , xu(yn) →a.e. xu(y′) and |xu(yn)| ≤
|xA| ∈ L1. By Lebesgue Theorem, we have u(yn) ⇀M u(y′). If λn → λ′
and vn →a.e. v′, N (λn) vn →a.e. N (λ′) v′ and |N (λn) vn| ≤ aMA ∈ L1 and
we conclude similarly.
We now characterize the Pareto optima. To this end, let us reconsider





E [u(t, yt, λ)] = max
v∈V
F (v, λ) with F (v, λ) = N(λ) · v.
From Lemma 14, problem Pλ is well defined. Let us show that it admits a
unique solution yλ (or vλ = u(yλ) depending on the chosen formulation).
Lemma 15 The problem Pλ has a unique solution denoted yλ. Therefore
F (., λ) reaches its maximum on V at a unique point vλ.
Proof. Let (yn) ⊂ Yς and ε > 0 be such that ‖yn − y′‖r → 0 and
N (λ) · u(yn) > N (λ) · u(y′) + ε for all n. There exists a subsequence
yϕ(n) →a.e. y′ and, by Lemma 14, we have N (λ)u(yϕ(n)) →L1 N (λ)u(y′)
which contradicts our assumption. Hence y → N (λ) ·u(y) is strongly u.s.c.
and therefore weakly u.s.c. on Yς which is weakly compact. Therefore it
admits a maximum yλ. Uniqueness of yλ follows from the strict concavity
of u, that of vλ from the monotonicity of u.
From Lemmas 13 and 15 and Equation (22), Pareto optima may be
described as follows:
Lemma 16 An allocation (c1, . . . , cN , y) is a Pareto optimum if and only
if there exists λ ∈ RN+ , such that y = yλ and ci = Ci(yλ, λ) for every i.
Let us next recall the definition of an equilibrium with transfers.
Definition 5 An allocation (c1, . . . , cN , y) with a strictly positive price process
p is an equilibrium with transfers if it verifies:
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1. y maximizes profit that is : p · y ≤ p · y for all y ∈ Y ,
2. For every i, ci maximizes U i(c) subject to p · c ≤ p · ci.
We now prove a second welfare theorem:
Lemma 17 For any λ ∈ RN+ , the allocation ((Ci(yλ, λ))i, yλ) with the price
uc(yλ, λ) is an equilibrium with transfer.
Proof. Let us first verify that the price process is in X ′. From (23),
Lemma 14 and Assumption (C), we have
uc(yλ, λ) = N(λ)u
′(yλ) ≤ aMu′(yλ) ≤ aMςγ−1 ∈ X ′.
As yλ solves Pλ, uc(yλ, λ) ∈ NY (yλ). Therefore yλ maximizes profit at price
uc(yλ, λ) proving the first property of an equilibrium with transfers. The
remainder of the proof which is totally standard is skipped.
A useful continuity property
The aim of this subsection is to prove that if λn → λ, then vλn ⇀M vλ
where we recall that :
F (vλ, λ) > F (v, λ), ∀ v ∈ V, λ ∈ Λ (25)
Lemma 18 1. V and MV are convex,
2. MV is sequentially σ(L1, L∞) compact and V is σ(XM , X ′M) sequen-
tially compact.
Proof. To prove assertion 1, note first that if the F-adapted process
t is such that u(ς) ≤ t ≤ u(y) for some y ∈ Yς , then t ∈ V . Indeed the
process u−1(t) is F-adapted and ς ≤ u−1(t) ≤ y. Therefore u−1(t) ∈ Yς
and t = u(u−1(t)) ∈ V . To show the convexity of V , let yi ∈ Yς for i = 1, 2
and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. As u(yi) ≥ u(ς) for i = 1, 2 and from the concavity of u
u(ς) ≤ λu(y1) + (1− λ)u(y2) ≤ u(λy1 + (1− λ)y2).
From our previous remark λu(y1) + (1 − λ)u(y2) ∈ V which implies that
V is convex and therefore MV is convex. To prove assertion 2, let us first
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prove thatMV is closed. LetMu(yn)→ z in the norm topology of L1 with
yn ∈ Yς . Then some subsequence Mu(ynk) → z a.e. Hence ynk → u−1( zM )
a.e. and as yn ≤ Ξ for any n, the convergence is also in Lr. As Yς is
closed, there exists y ∈ Yς such that y = u−1( zM ) and z = Mu(y) ∈ V .
Hence MV is norm closed and as it is convex, it is σ(L1,∞) closed. From
(24), MV is equi-integrable. It then follows from Dunford-Pettis’theorem
that it is sequentially σ(L1, L∞) compact. Hence every sequence Mvn has
a subsequence converging weakly in MV or equivalently every sequence vn
has a subsequence converging in V in the σ(XM , X ′M) topology proving
that V is σ(XM , X ′M) sequentially compact.
We now prove the main result of this subsection.
Lemma 19 1. If vn ⇀M v′ and λn → λ′, then F (vn, λn)→ F (v′, λ
′
).
2. If λn → λ, then vλn ⇀M vλ.
Proof. To prove assertion 1, we have
|F (v′, λ)− F (vn, λn)| ≤ |F (v′, λ′)− F (vn, λ′)|+ |F (vn, λn)− F (vn, λ′)| .
|F (v′, λ′)− F (vn, λ′)| = |N (λ′) · (v′ − vn)| → 0 as vn ⇀M v′ and N (λ′) ∈
X ′M . Moreover,
|F (vn, λn)− F (vn, λ′)| = |(N (λn)−N (λ′)) · vn| ≤ |(N (λn)−N (λ′))| · A.
and from Lemma 14 |F (vn, λn)− F (vn, λ′)| → 0.
To prove assertion 2, let λn → λ, then from Lemma 18 assertion 2, vλn has
a subsequence, still denoted vλn , such that vλn ⇀M v̄ with v̄ ∈ V . From
(25), for every n, we have F (vλn , λn) > F (v, λn), ∀ v ∈ V. Taking the limit
as n → ∞, we obtain from assertion 1 F (v̄, λ) ≥ F (v, λ), ∀ v ∈ V . As
F (·, λ) has as unique maximizer vλ, v̄ = vλ. Hence the sequence vλn has as
unique cluster point vλ and therefore vλn ⇀M vλ.
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Definition and Properties of the transfer map
We may now define the transfer map T by
T i(λ) = uc(yλ, λ) · (Ci(yλ, λ)− νiyλ) = Gi (vλ, λ) , for i = 1, . . . , N, (26)
with Gi (v, λ) = γN(λ) · (Si(λ)− νi) v. As uc(yλ, λ) ∈ X ′ for every λ , T is
well-defined. Let us quote a continuity property of G whose proof, similar
to that of the continuity of F is omitted.
Lemma 20 If (vn, λn) ⊂ V × Λ is such that vn ⇀M v′ and λn → λ′, then
G(vn, λn)→ G(v′, λ′).
Proposition 21 T is continuous on Λ and there exists λ∗ with λ∗i > 0 for
all i such that T i(λ∗) = 0 for all i.
Proof. To show the continuity of T i on Λ, let λn → λ′. From Lemma 19,
vλn ⇀M v(λ
′). Hence from Lemma 20, Gi (vλn , λn) → Gi (vλ′ , λ′) proving
the continuity of T i. The proof of existence of a λ∗ with λ∗i > 0 for all
i such that T i(λ∗) = 0 for all i is standard and follows the properties of
T (continuity, boundary behavior T i(λ) < 0 when λi = 0 for some i, and∑
T i(λ) = 0 for every λ ∈ Λ).
Proof of Theorem 4, Assertion 1. T has a zero to which corresponds
a Pareto optimum with zero transfer payments. It is therefore a production
equilibrium. Let us show that it is unique. Assume that there are two
equilibria
(




(c̃1, . . . , c̃N), ỹ, p̃
)
where without loss of
generality, prices are such that p̂ · ŷ = p̃ · ỹ = 1. Then ĉi is the optimal
solution to the problem
maxU i(c) s.t. p̂ · c ≤ νi,
and c̃i is the optimal solution to the problem
maxU i(c) s.t. p̃ · c ≤ νi.
From Dana (1995) Proposition 2.1, as utilities are homogeneous, we have
for every i,
(p̂− p̃) · (ĉi − c̃i) < 0.
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Summing over i, we obtain
(p̂− p̃) · (ŷ − ỹ) < 0.
From the definition of a production equilibrium, we have p̂ · ŷ ≥ p̂ · ỹ and
p̃ · ỹ ≥ p̃ · ŷ which leads to a contradiction. The uniqueness of the vector of
equilibrium utility weights follows immediately.
Remark 22 Existence and uniqueness of an exchange equilibrium for a
given y ∈ X+ follows from the previous theorem by choosing Y = {y}−X+.
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